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In this paper, I argue that machines are currently not, and may never be, intelligent in the 
same way as humans. I posit that machines are able to work within a set of rules and a set 
problem space but are unable to adapt outside this. I also consider machines that, on the 
surface, look intelligent but that are simply a process. I therefore believe that Philosophers 
such as Boden are too quick to start panic buying into the theory of machines taking over the 
world (Nolan, 2011). I believe we must be vigilant, but that currently we simply do not have 
the capability to build what Boden (Boden, 2016) believes will one day control us. 
 
The structure of this paper as follows. First, we look at what Artificial Intelligence consists of, 
what it does and how it works. We examine the main ways to create artificial intelligence: 
Heuristics, Genetic Algorithms and Artificial Neural Networks followed by Machine Learning. 
Next, we look at whether the entity we have described above could be thought of as 
intelligent. I argue that machines can never be intelligent due to the three following points 
(Which I will explain in each relevant section): 
 
A. The programs are restricted by rules 
B. The programs are not able to explore the full problem space 
C. The programs cannot adapt 
 
I give a recent, plausible, example of a computer program that fails each, or more, of the 
criteria. I then give the explanation for humans believing computers to be intelligent as the 
following: humans may be anthropomorphising machines and through this, forming an 
emotional attachment. Humans like to imagine animals with personalities and indeed assign 
machinery personalities, such as in Braitenberg’s Vehicles, but this may be a driver for humans 
believing that machines are intelligent, when in fact they are not. I then conclude by 
summarising the above argument and restating my belief that we cannot currently build 





2. Preliminaries - Intelligence 
 
2.1 What is Artificial Intelligence (AI)  
 
“Some call Artificial intelligence (AI) the science of intelligence in general” (Crane, 2003).   
 
 If we examine current computer programs like those which run Alexa, a laptop or a Robo 
Vacuum, we could ask whether they have real intelligence or real creativity.  However, we 
don’t yet fully understand the concepts of creativity or intelligence in relation to humans, so 
it is difficult to understand if computer programs could potentially have them. In this section 
I outline my definition of intelligence concerning artificial systems and give a plausible 
criterion that we can benchmark against in the following sections.  
 
In nature, we find seemingly intelligent systems such as humans or hamsters. We also now 
have systems that we have designed such as computers. Computers are artificial in nature and 
have been designed by humans, these may seem to exhibit intelligence. If Alexa answers my 
queries or the laptop is able to play chess with me I might believe it is displaying some kind of 
intelligent to be able to perform these tasks. The question is whether the systems we have 
created really do possess intelligence to any extent. In this respect, I take AI to mean an 
‘artificial system’. This is anything that we have designed and made, which appears to us,  to 
have intelligence, such as a computer chip or a computer program. 
 
In this paper, I will use three of the most plausible systems that are candidates for ‘intelligent 
machines’. One is a computer program, one is a Robo Vacuum, and one is a Laptop. I discuss 
robot vehicles with sensors and how they also fail the criteria in section   
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6.  Adaptability – Criterion C.  In all of these examples, the machinery is controlled by a 
computer program which consists of lines of commands and rules. The program is able to 
perform the tasks it is given in the environment it is given and within a strict set of rules. For 
example, a chess program can only play chess, a facial recognition program can only perform 
this one task, that is, unless we program it to do something else. However, most programs are 
specific to task. McCarthy states that “Progress in artificial intelligence has been mainly along 
the following lines. Programs have been written to solve a class of problems that give humans 
intellectual difficulty: examples are playing chess or checkers…proving mathematical 
theorems” (McCarthy J. a., Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial 
intelligence. In (pp. 431-450), 1981).  The Laptop is a more sophisticated machine that hosts a 
collection of programs, it is the interface that allows the human to alter or create or run 
programs. The laptop runs various programs such as word or excel. Both the laptop and 
program require human input to either schedule or perform tasks.   
 
Using the word ‘intelligence’ in terms of computer programs, as we shall see, refers to a 
system that is normally used to perform tasks which do not require much intelligence such as 
recognising a pattern or reading simple text. Unfortunately, the term ‘intelligence’, when used 
in the context of artificial intelligence in computing, is used to describe some rampant monster 
bent on taking over the world (Nolan, 2011). The systems we actually have at present could 
be classified at most as expert systems. These systems are very good at a specific skill such as 
pattern recognition, but we could not classify them as intelligent regardless of any ‘behaviour’ 
we believe they exhibit. 
 
If we look at Copelands book ‘Artificial Intelligence’ (Copeland, 2015) we see the concept of 
intelligence discussed with reference to algorithms, inference, reasoning, knowledge and 
thinking. I believe that intelligence is an overarching concept that we can use to describe many 
interlinked facets of our lives, from being able to adapt to the environment, to learning, to 
being able to reason around relevant elements of an environment to decision making. These 
elements, working together, make up what we could then coin ‘intelligence’. It appears that 
intelligence is not as simple a concept as we may think. Therefore, in the next section I attempt 
to set out and define three criteria that I believe we can then use to examine systems in order 








2.1.1  How can we define Artificial Intelligence 
 
When examining computers and their programs, we must have some sort of definition of 
intelligence to measure them against. I posit that three criteria can show us whether a 
computer program is intelligent. I would expect an intelligence entity to meet all three criteria 
in order to be genuinely intelligent. These three criteria are: 
 
A Not Rulebound 
B Ability to explore the full problem space 
C Ability to adapt 
 
I will give a brief explanation of the criteria in this section and then go on to discuss each more 
fully and argue against them in their requisite sections.  
The first Criterion I will explore is the concept of being not rule bound. Computer Programs 
are, by their nature, rule bound. The way we start to code a program is to explicitly specify all 
the parts of a program that will be used (what they are, what they consist of) and then all the 
ways in which these different parts will be used along with any rules for order of use. This is 
very explicit, and the program specifies the boundaries around how this will take place and in 
what order. It is not possible to code a computer program without this rules-based approach. 
Because of this restriction it is impossible for a program to work outside these rules. It may 
produce unexpected results, but it won’t at any point be able to adapt its programming or 
change the rules. This makes computer programs very good at being ‘experts’ at one particular 
task. As intelligent beings, humans are only rule bound to an extent. We are able to break the 
rules where we feel they don’t apply, or update rules if we think there is a better way of doing 
something. This enables us to adapt to our environment and become better at how we 
approach different tasks. A computer program can be updated by a human but cannot update 
itself in any major way. 
 
Criterion 2 is the ability to explore the whole problems space. The term ’artificial intelligence’ 
“suggests that AI is interested only in tasks we would ordinarily classify as requiring 
intelligence” (Crane, 2003). These expert systems, by definition, have a restricted problem 
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space in which to work. Take, for example, an Artificial Neural Network (ANN). One way in 
which we can use an ANN is to find patterns in data. The ANN would be given a specific set of 
data and trained on this and then given a similar set of data and asked to find a pattern. The 
data sets would be quite similar, the ANN would only perform this task, and would not be able 
to adapt to either find patterns in a wildly different data set, or for example, play chess. As we 
will see in 3.1.3  Methods of problem solving with Heuristics, programs like heuristics can suffer 
from blindness due to programming restrictions, which means they sometimes cannot find 
the best solution for the problem they are given. This is because they cannot see other global 
maxima or minima, just the local maxima or minima.  
 
If we examine human intelligence we can see that humans, even babies, when presented with 
a new situation, will explore, observe and experiment. Consider the toddler that runs around 
a new room to see what is in there. The toddler might be thinking what can it play with, what 
can it use as a tool. Indeed, the toddler will then start to chew things like tables and pencils 
because at this age the primary way to explore ones’ environment is with the senses such as 
taste, sight and touch. The toddler then finds things out about its environment such as; it’s 
not a good idea to touch the spiky cactus because it hurts, the strawberry tastes nice, the 
baseball bat makes a good tool for destroying things I don’t like. The child will remember, or 
learn about, these interactions and be able to use the learning in the future.  This type of life 
experience means that we have the ability to consider any situation, react to it accordingly by 
using our past learning and fragments we have learned from other situations and stay alive or 
be successful in our navigation of our environment. This I take to be the basis of any concept 
of intelligence. The term ‘life experience here I define by being able to interact with our 
environment, adapt to our environment and choose the relevant elements of the 
environment to be able to make decisions in any situation. This constitutes Criterion C. 
 
I will use these three criteria in the following sections to examine the laptop, computer 
program and Robo Vacuum, as well as vehicles with sensors, in order to decide whether they 
are intelligent. Whether these programs could, in the future, be intelligent is a matter for the 
development of technology but I do not believe we are even close to being able to develop a 
truly intelligent program, as we shall see in this paper. As Aguirre states “I attribute unusually 
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low probability to the near future prospect of AI – by which I mean an AI that can formulate 
abstract concepts based on experience” (Aguirre, 2015). 
 
 
2.1.2 Objections to my definition of intelligence 
 
Objection – Criterion A 
 
The first objection I would like to address is, well, don’t people just obey rules the same as 
computers? We all follow rules such as, don’t murder people and, stay within the speed limit, 




Yes, humans do live a life of rules, but their entire existence is not scripted by rules and, of 
course, humans also break those rules. Let us examine the following example from Crane: 
“A rookie bus driver, suspended for failing to do the right thing when a girl suffered a heart 
attack on his bus, was following overtly strict rules that prohibits drivers from leaving their 
routes without permission, a union official said yesterday. ‘If the blame has to be put 
anywhere, put it on the rules those people have to follow’” (Crane, 2003).  
By sticking to the bus route, the driver was unable to deal with the situation in a useful way 
or exercise his problem-solving capacities. Humans break rules in order to do the best they 
can within the circumstances. Sometimes the rules are just not appropriate to the situation. 
It is human’s ability to break the rules based their knowledge and intelligence that means we 
can do things like adapt to the environment and explore the problem space. It makes us the 
most successful species on the planet.  
 
Objection – Criterion B 
 
We could object that human not having full use of the senses, like a computer program, cannot 
explore their full environment and therefore cannot ‘see’ the whole problem space. What 
about a person who is blind or is deaf, or who is blind and deaf, could they still be intelligent 









In a paper by Arnold and Heiron on tactile memory, we see an experiment whereby ten deaf-
blind people and ten sighted-hearing participants were asked to take part in a matching pairs 
game. A tactile and textures set of matching pairs cards were used and the sighted-hearing 
participants were blindfolded. The results are that the deaf-blind participants took 
significantly less time to complete the task than the sighted-hearing participants. They also 
needed fewer attempts to find the matching pairs.  This suggests that “deaf-blind people have 
a more efficient means of encoding tactile spatial information” (Arnold, 2002). This shows that 
deaf and blind people actually rely on their other senses more and become more specialised 
in the active senses they have.  These people are still able to perform the same tasks but with 
adjustments. Using their senses in a more specialised way helps deaf-blind people continue 
to interact with their environment. Therefore, they are still able to view the problem space 
but in a different manner than we are normally used to. 
 
Objection- Criterion C 
 
This objection asks, well, how can a person with locked in syndrome be intelligent by your 
criteria. Can this person still be intelligent? They are not able to move their body and can’t 




A Person with locked in syndrome may not have been able to speak for years, is quadriplegic 
and is not able to communicate, however, they may still be able to use all their five senses 
 (Bauby, 2008. ). The key information here is that this type of illness is not necessarily found 
at birth and so people with locked in syndrome tend to have previous experience of living in 
the world and using their senses. Therefore, much of their learning has already taken place.  
If we look at a study in the Guardian, Doctors are able to read brainwaves of those that are 
 
1 Some people with locked in syndrome can move ever so slightly and that is how Jean-Dominique 
Bauby wrote his bestselling novel “the diving bell and the butterfly” with his left eyelid. I highly 
recommend the text. 
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‘locked in’ to determine whether they want to say “yes” or “no” (Chaudhary, 2017). Simply by 
being able to answer yes or no patients have been able to have a reasonable quality of 
communication with their families and Doctors. Even indicating that they are happy with their 
life. 
 
In the cases of the locked in person and person with limited sensory ability, we see intelligent 
people who have been able to interact with their environment and adapt to it at some point 
in their lives. Therefore, comparing these types of people to a machine that has no senses to 







3. Preliminaries - Technology 
 
3.1 – Computers, Programs and Artificial Intelligence. 
 
Computer programs have been noted to be good at playing chess or GO (DeepMind, 2018) or 
fast calculations, while humans are not so good in general at these tasks. However, humans 
are good at bodily skills and perceiving meaning, which computer programs have not been 
that good at. This is precisely why we have built computers and written programs to do tasks 
like perform fast calculations – this helps us achieve tasks that we are not as good at and it 
saves us time writing out a long calculation too.  
 
3.1.1 How do computer programs work? 
 
If we consider the specific design of computers we see that it consists of hardware, a power 
supply and circuit boards. Within this hardware lies the program that is the actual ‘brain’ or 
set of rules that runs the hardware. The hardware simply provides a way for this program to 
have somewhere to physically live and to be able to receive power. We will concentrate on 
the program from this point forward and name it AI. The next step from a desktop computer 
setup is the Virtual machine. Virtual machines are what it says on the tin, they are not made 
from computer parts or physical plugs and metal, they are in the ether so to speak. The virtual 
machine can be connected to cameras or physical input pads so that the programme can 
gather inputs. The AI does not need to be reliant on any kind of physical base to exist as it can 
be accessed from many machines by logging in. Just pulling a plug form one machine doesn’t 
shut down the AI it merely shuts down one machine.  
 
The computer programs above have their own language. We couldn’t write a program for a 
thermostat and just write something like “control my room temperature”. We would have to 
translate what we wanted into some very detailed programming describing what things we 
want in our system such as radiators, thermostats, hot water boilers. We would then have to 
programme in all the parameters of these objects. Then comes the interactions, how does 
each object interact with each other and what can’t the objects do under any circumstances. 
This uncertainty invariably leads to issues because Humans are apt to forget that Hot Water 
boilers should not be on for more than 12 hours at a temperature of 110 degrees or suchlike. 
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This is because we don’t really have to consider this when we switch on the thermostat. If we 
were then to ask the Thermostats to control the entire heating system of our house it is a very 
large problem to solve when considering the task of programming in all the rules required for 
the thermostat to control the whole house heating and hot water system. 
 





3.1.2  Solving large problems 
 
 
Computer Programs use problem solving techniques that require large amounts of processing 
power, the alternative is brute force solutioning which would involve, in chess for example, 
the listing of every single chess move. Brute force then is clearly not a reasonable approach. 
The problem-solving method comes in two parts. The first part is for the AI to look at only one 
part of the problem space where the AI assumes the solution is located. The second method 
is to construct a new search space by reframing the problem. This second approach comes 
under the banner of Heuristics.  
Computers work to solve problems such as this or pattern recognition of a face within a set of 
rules that a Human provides for them.  Artificial Neural Networks and Heuristics work in 
similar ways to answer these problems.  First let us see an example of the type of problem we 
might as a computer problem to solve and how Heuristics works to solve these types of 
problem. 
3.1.3  Methods of problem solving with Heuristics 
 
Heuristics are computer programs that aim to optimise a given problem. They work by using 
rules and constraints and permutate the possible outcomes in order to achieve the best result. 
Many problems in practice consist of the search for a “best” solution of a set of variables to 
achieve some goals and these types of problems are called optimisation problems.  
Optimisation means solving problems in which one seeks to minimise or maximise an 
objective function (such as maximise my profit) by systematically choosing the values of the 
decision variables from within an allowed set.  An optimisation problem is defined by decision 
variables and constraints. 
Decision variables: If there are n decisions to be made, they are represented as decision 
variables  
X = x1, x2, ..., xn  
Constraints are restrictions on the values that can be assigned to the decision variables 
expressed mathematically by means of inequalities or equations. We would try to optimise an 
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Consider a chocolate manufacturing company that wants to maximise its profit. The Company 
produces two chocolate bars A&B but does not know the mix of the two which will generate 
the largest profit. Both the chocolate bars require Milk and Choco in different amounts. Milk 
and Choco have different prices.  To manufacture each unit of A and B, following quantities 
are required: 
• Each unit of A requires 1 unit of Milk and 3 units of Choco 
• Each unit of B requires 1 unit of Milk and 2 units of Choco 
The company kitchen has a total of 5 units of Milk and 12 units of Choco. On each sale, the 
company makes a profit of 
• Rs 6 per unit A sold 
• Rs 5 per unit B sold. 
Now, the company wishes to maximize its profit and faces, what looks like quite a difficult 
problem. The Company wants to know how many units of A and B should it produce for the 
highest profit. 
 Milk Choco Profit per unit 
A 1 3  Rs 6 
B 1 2  Rs 5 
Total 5 12  
  
• Let the total number of units produced of A be = X 
• Let the total number of units produced of B be = Y 
• Now, the total profit is represented by Z 
The total profit the company makes is given by the total number of units of A and B produced 
multiplied by its per unit profit Rs 6 and Rs 5 respectively. 
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Profit: Max Z = 6X+5Y 
Which means we have to maximize Z as this means we maximise profit. 
The company will try to produce as many units of A and B to maximize the profit. But the 
resources Milk and Choco are available in limited amount. 
As per the above table, each unit of A and B requires 1 unit of Milk. The total amount of Milk 
available is 5 units. To represent this mathematically, 
X+Y ≤ 5 
Also, each unit of A and B requires 3 units & 2 units of Choco respectively. The total amount 
of Choco available is 12 units. To represent this mathematically, 
3X+2Y ≤ 12 
Also, the values for units of A can only be integers. 
So we have two more constraints, X ≥ 0  &  Y ≥ 0 
For the company to make maximum profit, the above inequalities have to be satisfied. 
(Kashyap, 2017) 
This logic that we have developed above, the constraints and objective function, will all have 
to be programmed into a computer in a way that it understands so that it can perform the 
permutations necessary to find the maximum profit. The problem above represents a 
common problem that we would not be able to solve by hand but that we might ask a 
computer to solve fairly quickly for us. The next stage is a heuristic that doesn’t permutate 
every single solution of the problem, it uses a search heuristic to work through increasingly 
good solutions. Below is a diagram of how the computer program might achieve this but 




Artificial Neural Networks were then developed in order to advance this type of problem 
solving. Artificial Neural Networks sound like an artificial representation of a biological neural 
network. Admittedly they were designed in this way but the actual title might mislead as they 
do not behave in the same way as a Human Neural Network. They simply perform more of the 
tasks we have just worked through. 
 
3.1.4  Artificial Neural Networks (ANN’s) 
 
An ANN is the most plausible program that could pass for AI. It is the most advanced piece of 
computing we have right now but whether it is intelligent or not is another question. ANN’s 
have garnered much publicity over the years. Widely touted as being the next Skynet we have 
been in awe and in fear of them at the same time, but what do ANN’s actually do? An ANN is 




Figure 1 ANN example, (School, 12) 
 
 
A biological neuron and its inputs/outputs are shown above. The ANN has nodes and 




The type of activity performed by an ANN is called machine learning and is viewed to be 
superior to that of GA’s or Heuristics, this is because Heuristics are not able to perform pattern 
recognition or manipulate large data sets, but ANN’s can. When using ANN’s we give the 
network a set of data and it then uses rules input by a human to ‘train’ itself to produce good 
predictions of that data based on the given rule set. The ANN structure above would be 
regarded as a connectionist architecture. All the nodes are connected to one another and they 
have different weights attached to them within the architecture. Each unit has a firing 
threshold which, when exceeded, turns the node on.  and when the current drops below the 
threshold then the node is turned off. Units are arranged as above in the 2D space and there 
is also a 3D space where layers of these nodes and connections are connected to each other. 
There is an input layer and an output layer with many possible configurations of layers in 
between them. The network changes state all at once, not step by step like Heuristics do. Once 
the network settles into equilibrium then we can read the answer off from the output layer. 
In order to read this answer, we have to remember how we designed the network in the first 
place. We could have designed the network to feed off localised answers from a localised state 
or to produce an answer that comes from the state of the entire system. We are able to then 
feed in some data to the network (except the last ten or so answers) and then ask it what the 
next predicted number would be. As the network runs multiples times it tries to get closer to 
the correct answer (the answer that we already know). If we alter the weights and the node 
configuration we might get an even better answer.  We can then change to a similar data set, 
but one that the network has not worked on before and run the network with the new data. 
After a few hundred or thousand simulations, the network might be able to get close to 





3.2 Does an ANN meet the criteria for Intelligence? 
 
An ANN is trained so specifically on a given data set it must be given a very similar data set to 
be tested on. Much variation from the original data set will cause the network to fail and it 
will produce wildly variable estimates. For example, if we used a set of photos of cats and 
asked the network to recognise cats, we could train the network to adequately recognise cats 
from this particular set of photos. If we then gave the network another group of photos of 
Cats, then the Network may very well state that it cannot find any pictures of cats. “’Learning’ 
takes place when the relations between units are systematically altered in a way which 
produces an output close to the target” (Crane, 2003). 
When we give the ANN a slightly different version of the data or a completely new data set 
the programme really doesn’t do very well at finding a pattern, this is because the rules-based 
programming is so specific and geared towards the ANN finding the answer that we know 
already, there is little to no flexibility within the system. The ANN is not able to go outside the 
problem space it is given, and this is seen when we give the ANN a completely new task or set 
of data and then have to reprogram it very specifically to deal with the problem space we 
desire an answer from. If we go back to our definition of qualities for intelligence we have 
already struck off the first two definitions, non-rule bound and adaptability to problem space, 
therefore, ANN’s cannot meet the criteria for intelligence.2 
  
 
• 2The programs are restricted by rules 
• The programs are not able to explore the full problem space 




4. Rulebound – Criterion A 
 
In this section we discuss Criterion A, namely that computer programs are rule bound and 
cannot roam outside their rules. As we saw in the previous section where we discussed how 
computer programs work, it is evident that they are based on a framework of rules designed 
by a human. This human may or may not have thought of all the instances that the computer 
needs the rules to reflect in order for the computer program to operate effectively.  
Roger Schank, however, thought that computer programs were not constrained by rules and 
could roam outside these rules. Back in the 1970’s, Schank (Shank, 1977) created a computer 
program that supposedly imitated the human ability to understand stories. The program was 
then able to answer questions about the story despite the questions relating to information 
that was not explicitly given during the story telling. The machine answers questions such as: 
A man has been wanting a particular pair of trousers for some time, he walks into a shop and 
the trousers are there on the rack in his size and on sale at a substantial discount, did the man 
buy the trousers? The computer would say yes. Schank’s program is able to answer questions 
of this format. Two claims that have been made about Schanks work is that this program is; 
1) able to understand the story and provide answers to questions and  
2) What the machine and its ability do is explain the way humans are able to understand the 
story and ask questions about it.  Searle (Searle J. , 1980) disagrees with these claims, as do I, 
and uses his Chinese room thought experiment to show why he disagrees. 
 
4.1 The Chinese Room  
 
The Chinese Room examples goes as follows. Suppose I understand English but no Chinese 
whatsoever.  I am locked in a room that has an in chute, an out chute and a book of 
instructions in English detailing how to manipulate Chinese Characters. I am given one set of 
Chinese symbols and then a second batch of Chinese script together with rules for correlating 
the first batch with the second batch.  I can understand these rules as they are in English. 
“These rules mean I can correlate one set of symbols in the first batch to the symbols in the 
second batch.  I am able to identify the symbols by their shapes, so I don’t know what the 
symbols mean. I then receive a third batch of Chinese symbols with English instructions.  on 
how to correlate these symbols with the ones from the first and second batch.  These rules 
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also tell me how to give back certain Chinese symbols with certain sorts of shapes in response 
to the shapes I am given. I don’t know that the first batch of symbols is a script, the second is 
a story and the third is questions. The Fourth batch, or what I give back, are called answers to 
the questions. The set of rules I am given is called the program.  Through iterations I get very 
good at responding to the symbols in the correct way and the programmers give me a 
substantially improved set of rules. I could be mistaken for a Chinese speaker! I repeat the 
same exercise with questions in English put into my little room and I give back replies in 
English. I am good at the English answers because I am English and therefore taken to be a 
native speaker. From outside the box I look as proficient in English as I do in Chinese however, 
I behave like a computer in interpreting the Chinese symbols and replying” (Searle J. , 1984).  
This is all illustrated in the following diagram.  
 
 
Figure 2 The Chinese Room Problem  (Stilton, 2017) 
 
Searle’s point here is that I produce stories and questions in Chinese that will make sense to 
the outside reader, but in no way, do I understand Chinese. This is because I have whole 
sentence inputs and whole sentence outputs. My opponent might say, but if you memorise 
the whole Chinese Language why wouldn’t you understand Chinese, surely you could then use 
it to communicate with people. My answer is yes of course you could but if they pointed at a 
chair how would you know what word related to ‘chair’. 
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Therefore, If I memorised the whole rule book I couldn’t be learning Chinese.  This is because 
there is clearly a difference between me manipulating Chinese symbols and English symbols. 
The English Symbols mean something to me that the Chinese ones do not. When I speak 
English, I am not dealing with sentences and paragraphs I am using a more intuitive way of 
speaking English, which may follow rules, but not the ones with which I translate Chinese in 
the room. We discuss this further in the following objections to Searles room.    
 
The way we understand language comes from interacting with our environment throughout 
life. By this I mean during our lifetimes we interact with many objects, people and, even more 
complex, scenarios. We watch others interact with things around them and not only do we 
learn by our interactions not to touch the prickly bush and then remember not to touch the 
prickly bush next time we see it, we also observe others and when they touch the hot stove 
we then think, “it might be a bad idea to touch the hot stove”. We then reflect on what we 
have seen. As a consequence, very few of us would then go and touch the hot stove just to 
check. Through learning in this way, and remembering, we are then able to build upon our 
knowledge of our environment and carry what we have observed into new situations. This 
enables us to adapt to new situations by using fragments of what we have learned of other 
situations, or indeed choose the most relevant parts of past interactions or situations that 
might be relevant to this new one.  As an example, I am able to point at objects and be told 
repeatedly what they are I will learn the name of the object. I may then want to ask for a knife 
and fork, as I want to eat lunch, and then the sentence structure starts to take over and I might 
learn connecting words. Through mimicking its parents and reinforced learning, children can 
learn how objects interact. Therefore, if I had Chinese symbols for a knife and a fork but I 
never knew what they represented then I would never be able to ask for a knife and a fork. 
There is a large difference in the way I work with the two languages. Although I am part of a 
‘program’ here, it is not very relevant as I could take my skills with me outside the box. I could 
not hope to continue to give answers back to a Chinese person if I was outside the box without 
taking my huge rule book with me. 
 
As Searle states “I have everything that artificial intelligence can put into me by way of a 
program and I understand nothing” (Searle J. , 1980). Searle here gives one suggestion that 
the mistake of assuming the person in the room, or even the person+paper+pen+room 
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understand Chinese is a mistake of the anthropomorphic kind. “We say the door ‘knows’ when 
to open because of its photo electric cell” (Searle J. , 1980) or the calculator ‘knows how to 
add two numbers’. Searle puts this down to the tools we design and create being for our 
purposes and so we attribute out intentionality to them.  This we will explore further in the 







4.1.1 Some Objections to the Chinese Room example 
 
Objection - The Whole System can understand Chinese 
 
An objection Crane raises to Searle is that “The person in the room is analogous to only a part 
of the computer not to the computer itself” (Crane, 2003).  Therefore, the understanding is 
not a quality of the person it is a quality of the rulebook plus the paper I write on plus myself. 




If I memorised the whole of the rule book and came outside the room and could still translate 
the pages of words I was given, I would still not understand Chinese. This again is due to the 
inputs and outputs being whole sentences.  Searle responds to the objection above by saying 
that if I am examining the Man in the Clothes Shop story in English then I know we are talking 
about clothes and a man and his preferences for certain trousers. In the Chinese room, I 
receive a squiggle and I am instructed, by the rule book, to reply with a squiggle dot squiggle. 
I have no idea what I am saying to people. In English, we may manipulate symbols, but they 
have a meaning to us and we are able to picture the man in the shop, empathise with him and 
possibly think that in his situation we might buy those trousers too. In the Chinese room, we 
reply ‘squiggle’. Whether this ‘squiggle’ is a reply to the Man in the shop about his trouser 
choice or a fortune cookie insert I do not know. If we were to take the Chinese room as having 
a sort of intelligence or understanding then we might then say, as Searle states, “my stomach 
does information processing…but I take it we do not want to say that it has any 
understanding” (Searle J. , 1980). 
 
 
Objection - What if we put a computer inside a robot instead 
 
Another objection is that we could put a computer inside a robot. This robot is undertaking 
activities such as working, drinking, eating, and is walking around China. The symbols don’t 
translate words anymore, they actually operate the Robot’s body. The Robot has a camera so 
it can see things and arms and legs with which to undertake activities and interact with the 
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environment. This Robot is now part of the system and is interacting with the environment so 




Here the Robot is able to interact with the environment and may have a program that says, 
‘read the next sentence’ or ‘look up x’. This, scenario seems more promising. The robot could 
look at a chair for example and send a sentence back asking how to sit down on it, the program 
would send back, and answer driven by the rule book which answers this question.  But what 
is missing here? Firstly, there is no element of learning, if the robot does sit on the chair, it will 
not then go to another chair and remember how to sit, it will constantly send commands and 
questions back to the programme that will answer the queries. If we asked the robot what the 
Man in the shop would do given the trousers he very much likes are on sale at an affordable 
price, the robot would send a command to ask the program what the answer might be. Here 
the robot has not looked at the different scenarios in either case. A human would examine 
the problem as we discussed above and return a very quick response based on experience or 
desire that the Man would clearly purchase the trousers and there would have to be a 
mitigating circumstance, such as he lost his wallet, for him to not purchase the trousers.  The 
Robot with the senses, therefore, adds very little to the situation. There still seems to be 





4.2  Rulebound–  Summary  
 
In this section, we have examined Criterion A which states that computer programs are rule 
bound to the extent that they cannot operate outside of their rules. One might say that this 
denies them flexibility. However, in order for the program to operate outside the rules, the 
rules to do this would have to be programmed into the computer. Here, we circle back to the 
argument that computers are a tool for man, that man has designed and cannot make 
decisions for themselves outside their ‘rulebook’. Crane puts this succinctly in the following 
quote: “Computers must, by their very nature, stick to…some strict rules – and therefore will 
never be able to behave with..flexible, spontaneous responses” (Crane, 2003)   
If we suddenly gave a program like GO (DeepMind, 2018) permission to think outside the rules 
it would not recognise this line of code because it has only been programmed to play GO. If 
we gave permission for the computer to not follow the rules we would have to specify what 
other things it could do and then programme them in leading to another set of rules.  
 
Fei Fei Le, a Professor in Computer Science at Stanford, stated that "Machines still stumble in 
plenty of situations, especially when more context, backstory, or proportional relationships 
are required…. Computers..may have trouble telling the difference between an elephant’s 
head and trunk and a teapot. Similarly, they stumble when distinguishing between a statue of 
a man on a horse and a real man on a horse, or mistake a toothbrush being held by a baby for 
a baseball bat. And let’s not forget, we’re just talking about identification of basic everyday 
objects”. (Li, 2015). This is an example of where programs are able to make errors that humans 
would not necessarily make.  Li’s example shows that we haven’t got to a stage where we can 
adequately program a computer to tell the difference between everyday objects so if we had 
a robot with sensors – as above- it would be debateable if it would even be able to recognise 
the chair. My opponent might state that facial recognition is getting pretty good these days. 
The response to this is that unfortunately what you think is facial recognition is a 
measurement of three points on the face. These three points are not equated to individual 
and are used by the security services to ensure the passport photo of the person stays within 
the same proportions. The computer program is not looking at the eyes and their shape or the 
mouth and its dimensions or even the expression, it is merely checking the three points on 
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the face have not moved out of proportion3.  Therefore, the computer program is not able to 
‘recognise’ the whole face and wouldn’t recognise Barbara walking down the street. What the 






3 Classified Project on Facial Recognition for UK Government, Marie Oldfield, 2016 
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5. Problem Space – Criterion B 
 
The second criterion I used to define intelligence was being able to see the problem space. As 
we saw in the last section, computers are programmed to do specific tasks and in specific 
ways. The ANN demonstrates that it cannot see the whole problem space because it is not 
flexible, it is rule driven and works on a specific task in a specific problem space. It is unable 
to form overarching concepts of its work. Because of this rule driven existence we encounter 
problems such as the ones where the Heuristics programs are unable to find a local minima 
but not a global minima because it would get stuck in the local area. This disadvantage of not 
being able to see the whole problem space leaves some computer programs stuck in a small 
area of the entire problem space. The Robo Vacuum cannot ‘see’ further than hoovering until 
it hits a wall then turning away from the wall. The Vacuum is not able to detect the chair or 
the table, just obstacles. The Robo Vacuum is not able to detect the food spillage and 
recognise that it is not something it should hoover up. It is also not able to see the top of the 
stairs and realise it will fall over the side of the stairs if it tries to hoover around that area and 
makes a slight misstep. This might also be true of say, a blind person, but the blind person is 
able to use their touch to understand the environment, their memory to memorise the house 
layout and their awareness to integrate the two. The frame problem, in the next section, tries 
to determine if it is possible to limit the reasoning required in order to determine both the 
scope of the action required in a given situation and how we can make decisions using only 
what is relevant to a situation and ignoring that which is irrelevant to the situation. Chow 
defines this as the “Generalized Relevance Problem” “The problem of determining, from all 
the information that can in principle bear, what is relevant to the cognitive task at hand” 






5.1 The Framing Problem 
 
The origins of the “Framing problem” were defined by John McCarthy and Patrick J. Hayes in 
their 1969 article, Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence 
(McCarthy J. a., 1981). In this article McCarthy and Hayes stated that “A computer program 
capable of acting intelligently in the world must have a general representation of the world in 
terms of which its inputs are interpreted” (McCarthy J. a., 1981). A good example of this is; If 
we are in an ‘escape room’ and part of that room was sealed off, but the part that was sealed 
off held the key to the door to escape, we would have a problem. With no other way to exit 
to room and no knowledge of the full room, or problem space, we are a sinking ship.  Let us 
examine the original framing problem. 
 
Example 1 - The Monkey 
 
A Monkey is put in a box. In this box is a window, a banana hanging from a string, a small box 
on the floor and three pulleys attached to the rope from which the banana hangs. 
Unbeknownst to the Monkey a smaller box is then added into the larger box. The smaller box 
obscures the pulleys and most of the rope. The Monkey can only now see the Banana and 
what is in the smaller box.  How does the Monkey get the Banana? 
 
 




Here the monkey is only able to see part of the environment. Much useful information is 
missing. If the Monkey wants the Banana he could only try to jump, but it looks like the jump 
might be too high. He could climb onto the box and jump off the box to get more height. The 
window is not a lot of use to the Monkey.  There aren’t many options open to the Monkey in 
his current situation. If, however, the Monkey is able to take in his whole environment, if we 
remove the smaller box obscuring his vision, he would see that the box is attached to a few 
pulleys and the rope going through these pulleys is attached to the banana at one end and the 
box at the other. Now that the Monkey knows this, he can experiment with his environment. 
This might mean the monkey trying to figure out how the box and pulleys and banana might 
be connected and then experimenting by moving the box or pulling the wire to see what 
happens.  
This example if not merely an example of a monkey prevented from being able to literally see 
its environment it is also a conceptual example of how, if the computer program cannot 
operate in a non-restricted environment then it is prevented from finding better solutions or 
integrating other programs that might be useful. For example, on a laptop we have a program 
called word. Sometimes people start to draw tables in word and put numbers in. Neither word 
nor the laptop is able to then say, hang on a minute, I have excel that does this better and can 
even do calculations for you then you can copy and paste the table from there – would you 
like to do that instead? That kind of integrated environment, or just ability to access the wider 
environment then gives the laptop more scope to be helpful and pre-empt the users 
requirements. As we saw before the in the Heuristics example, when the program is restricted 
to only find solutions in the local area, it completely misses the global solutions which might 
be much better.  The Monkey example is a simple example, let us look at a more complex 





Example 2 – R1 and R2 
 
Dennett (Dennett, 1987) give an excellent example of this when he talks about future Robot 
R1.  Robot R1 was informed by its designers that its spare battery was locked in a room with 
a time bomb. R1 went to the room and saw that the battery was on a wagon along with the 
time bomb. R1 then pulled the wagon form the room and got the wagon out of the room 
before the bomb went off. The bomb went off after R1 left the room as R1 had brought the 
wagon with the battery and the bomb on it out of the room. Therefore, the spare battery was 
destroyed. 
 
The designers then redesigned R1 and renamed it R2.  
R2 was in the same predicament as R1. R1 went to the room where the spare battery was, 
and it began to consider what the sequences of any given action would be. R1 had “just 
finished deducing that pulling the wagon out of the room would not change the colour of the 
room’s walls” (Dennett D. a., 1987) and had calculated that the revolutions of the wheels 
would be greater in number than the physical wheels on the wagon…and then the bomb went 
off.  Gryz (Gryz, 2013) makes a good suggestion that “if it were -1000c outside, which would 
have frozen the bomb and prevented it from going off, then that would have been a safe 
course of action. This would then make temperature relevant whereas before it had not been.  
This example shows how R1 or R2, given more information about the environment, or better 
access to the environment, could have made better decisions. Additionally, if R2 knew better 
what elements of the environment were relevant that would have helped R2 retrieve the 
battery successfully. Therefore, we not only need to consider what is relevant in the 
environment but what the entire environment consists of. Next, we examine objections to the 








In the section on Heuristics we saw a program that might be the answer here. Given the 
situation that the bomb is on the floor, the wagon is in the centre of the room with the battery 
on it, it is a standard wagon that works, there are no obstacles between R1 and removing the 
wagon from the room and the walls are yellow. Suppose we take the situation that R1 finds 
itself in and we give it the characteristics of the problem that are relevant such as where the 
bomb is, where is the battery, is the wagon relevant. We can then weight some courses of 
action such as, if the battery is on the floor then the wagon is irrelevant. If the battery is on 
the wagon but the bomb is on the floor them the bomb is irrelevant. If the battery and bomb 
are on the floor them take the bomb off the wagon and take the wagon out with the battery 
on it. Whatever colour the walls are they are not relevant. Here we can start to see a solution 
for this problem. We could even set it up in the form we saw with constraints and an objective 





In the situation with R2 we saw the Robot run out of time to retrieve the battery due to too 
many seemingly relevant factors to consider. Dennett states that “A walking encyclopaedia 
will walk over a cliff, for all its knowledge of cliffs and the effects of gravity, unless it is designed 
in such a fashion that it can find the right bits of knowledge at the right times, so it can plan 
its engagements with the real world” (Dennett D. , 2005).  Copeland rightly questions the 
concept of ‘relevance’ in the framing problem above. How can R2 know what relevant 
information consists of in a given situation. Copeland quotes Guh and Levy (Guha, 1990) on 
their definition of irrelevance as being “a fact that clearly need not be taken into account in 
solving a specified problem” (Copeland, 2015). This sounds like we are able to, according to 
Guh and Levy, pinpoint parts of a problem that are irrelevant and subsequently be able to tell 
a computer program this information. However, Copeland states that each situation creates 




1. For the last eight years the rains in Malawi have not started until the end of November 
2. Timber production in Zambia has increased 500 per cent in the period 1972-92 
(Copeland, 2015) 
 
The relevance on one statement to the next depends upon the context in which they sit 
according to Copeland. If we would like to determine when we should go on safari to avoid 
the rain then we would consider (1), but if we wanted to examine climate change we might 
consider (2). However, if the deforestation has caused longer and wetter seasons in Zambia 
and that is our Safari destination we might want to consider them both. Copeland determines 
that it is daunting to consider giving a robot like R1 detailed information about what is relevant 
in each situation. However, if we were able to give R1, R2 or any program, the database of 
human ’common sense’, and through that, the ability to choose relevant elements of the 
environment to work with we might be able to solve this problem altogether.  Take, for 
example, the monkey in the box, it would be useless for the monkey to spend a good few 
hours pondering over the window and its short curtains, what colour the walls are and the 
relevance of that colour on the problem at hand.  In the situation R2 was in, R2 ran the code 
for so many irrelevant factors it was effectively paralysed in its decision making and could not 
act within the time limit. This shows how important it is to not only consider one’s 
environment, but also be able to choose the relevant elements within it.  The ‘CYC’ has made 
a good effort to try to create a database that would help R1 or R2 in their quest for the spare 




The CYC (not abbreviated) was developed by the Microelectronics and Computer Technology 
Corporation in 1984 the goal was to build a database of ‘collecting explicit logical descriptions 
of common-sense knowledge’. It involves hand coding assertions and knowledge into a 
 
4 It is interesting how the study chose a spare battery as the item to retrieve, this seems like the programmers 
wanted us to think that the robot could ‘understand’ their own need for, and importance of, a spare battery. 
This instantly anthropomorphises the situation by making us think, that if we were the robot, we would want a 
spare battery, or compare it to situations where if it were spare food and not a spare battery and basing this on 
a future need then we would ‘want’ to retrieve it. Why, for instance, did they not say retrieve the rock. 
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database.  The CYC grew to about 1 million assertion and axioms of ‘common sense’ by 1994, 
and as of 2017 the number stands at about 24.5 million. This has taken well over 1,000 person-
years of effort to construct.  
 
Figure 4 CYC Topic Map  (Panton, 2006) 
The CYC groups information in to the types of blocks above. The information is then, 
“transformed into … a kind of pre-factual knowledge, the type of information humans learn 
effortlessly but rarely need to articulate” (Panton, 2006).  The CYC, although not finished, 
contains a huge amount of generally intuitive, learned, ‘common sense’ that we could put 
straight into a computer. Hopefully, after having read the database in, the program might be 
able to use this vast amount of ‘common sense’ information to make better decisions. The 
CYC seems promising as a collection of common-sense axioms that a computer program could 
use to inject common sense into their conclusions. 
 
Reply: Temporal Issues 
 
A large conceptual and technical restriction with the CYC is how would we use it within a 
program. Having a program read in and store the database would not work as the database is 
too large.  If we asked the program to reference the CYC and go to it if it came up with “should 
I walk on lava” we would have huge issues on how to code into the program to do this. The 
program would first have to know how to query the database and when it should perform the 
query. If the program performs this query for everything it would take a very long time for the 
computer to work out what to do. When the computer is making the queries one at a time, 
does it ask one query then decide on a course of action or make many queries at once and 
then decide on a course of action. Also, how would the computer process all this information 
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especially if some of it is contradictory. This leads to a major problem with CYC regarding 
aspects of context such as time, space, and number could not be captured.  
 
Crane gives the following example of this problem. 
Freda is stood next to an Assassin with a gun. The program has been coded with the following: 
Freda is alive when the assassin loads the gun at time t and is also told that:  
 
1) If a live human is shot in the head, they die immediately 
 
The gun is not fired for two minutes. At the end of this time the Assassin steps out from the 
shadows and pulls the trigger at Freda’s head. A human would say that Freda is probably dead. 
The program has been given the following axioms:  
 
2) Unless abnormal circumstances - If a gun is loaded at time t then unless it is fired it will 
still be loaded at t+2 
 
The program has also been told that: 
 
3) Unless abnormal circumstances - A thing that is alive at t will continue to be alive at 
t+2 minutes. 
 (Crane, 2003) 
The program then arrives at the conclusion that Freda is alive t+2 therefore the gun was not 
loaded at t+2. Therein lies the issue with the program updating itself. It has updated to output 
that: 
 
1) the gun was still loaded at t+2 b and Freda is dead.  
2) The gun was unloaded between t and t+2 and Freda is still alive 
In each case one axiom fails. There are also many different ways to update a description in 
line with the given axioms. This could rely on the CYC repository we discussed above but again 
we run into the problem that the information required to solve this problem is rather large 




5.1.2 Consequences of the Frame Problem for Artificial Intelligence 
 
We can see here that the burden of programming every eventuality and characteristic of a 
situation into a robot would not be possible. Some actions or consequences might be tightly 
interlinked with other, making the problem even more complex than before. Gryz states that 
“in order for it [robot] to operate in a real world, it must have all the information explicitly 
supplied and then organised in such a way that only the relevant portion of it is used when it 
is time to act”. This, Gryz thinks we are not even able to contemplate programming robots in 
this way yet. The robot here had not solved the “methodological problem for a cognitive 
system of making reasonably accurate determinations of relevance efficiently and in a timely 
fashion” (Chow, 2013).  
 
Currently, the way this kind of problem is solved by programmers is to program as many 
eventualities as we think there might be in a given situation but then produce numerous 
versions of the same program, each containing different combinations of these features. 
Some programmers can put all the features they can imagine into the program and use an IF 
command so that the feature switches on if it is present – but this would be determined by 
the human telling the computer is the feature was present or not. The way most analytical 
programs work is that they use a generic framework and input a ‘scenario’ which contains the 
features the programmer wants to examine and then see how that operates within the 
framework. Here the programmer is needed in order to tell the machines how they should 
process commands and indeed the programmer provides all the commands for the program. 
The program can only be as good as the programmer makes it. In the future, if technology 
changes, we may be able to make these connections, and then the CYC would be very 
valuable, but currently we do not have the technology to link the CYC in any meaningful way 







5.2  Problem Space –  Summary  
 
Until we move away from the deterministic type of rule book to a more dynamical way of a 
computer program being able to use information and determine relevant features of a 
situation we will never be able to get close to a version of machine intelligence. At present, 
we do not have a way to accomplish this. We have the CYC, a valiant effort at recording the 
whole of the human common sense, and heuristics that might go some way to helping us solve 
the problem.  However, at present the frame problem remains a large stumbling block for 
artificial intelligence. We see the consequences in the laptop that needs its human to navigate 
the plethora of programs that run on it. If we started to build a table in word the laptop 
wouldn’t suggest we use excel because its more suited to that task. The Robo Vacuum also 
fails Criteria 2 by falling down the stairs and not recognising it has other rooms to vacuum 
until placed there by its owner. Programs can only operate in the problem space they were 
designed to solve, we generally don’t expect more than that or make programs to do more 
than that. As we have seen before, programs are designed to solve specific problems that 
humans find tedious or long winded.  The next section discusses whether a computer program 




6.  Adaptability – Criterion C 
 
When the environment changes around a program, the program is mostly unable to adapt 
unless programmed to do so by a human.  If the program is unable to adapt without 
interference, then this is not true adaption to an environment by the program itself. One 
would expect an intelligent entity to be able to adapt to its environment and use skills and 
knowledge it has gained to do this. Most species that have survived thus far have this skill. 
“Learning and development are essential processes for an animal to adapt itself to 
environmental changes so as to accomplish a given task” (Minato, Self-improvement for 
environmental change adaptation of mobile robot., 1998) 
We saw earlier with ANN’s that they are given a huge data set and trained on it to produce 
similar results to the inputs. If we then give the ANN a completely new data set it takes a long 
time for the ANN to start to produce sensible results. This new data set, of course, cannot be 
too different from the last or the ANN will fail entirely to find patterns. If we asked a program 
to stop playing GO and start playing chess, without the coding to do that the program would 
simply stop.  We could start giving word some spreadsheets to calculate but this would be 
completely futile. As Minato states, “most of existing robot learning methods have considered 
the environment where their robots work unchanged, therefore, the robots have to learn 
from scratch if they encounter new environments” (Minato, 2013). This section discusses 






6.1 Examples of non - adaptability in computer programs 
 
6.1.1  Vehicle example 
 
Minato and Asada have undertaken an experiment in which they attempt to provide coding 
to a robot which will, according to the code, learn from its environment and display 
adaptability. In this experiment the robot is a small vehicle that is powered by two motors. 
The vehicle is equipped with highly sensitive sonar sensors and cameras. The vehicle, using 
these sonar sensors can detect its environment, and by using polar coordinates can map 
where each obstacle lies relative to the vehicle. The vision processing from the cameras 
provides the size and shape of the obstacles. This sounds promising that a vehicle can detect 
the obstacle and use that information to adapt to its environment. At first Minato and Asado 
don’t provide the vehicle with a way to process this information and so as much as the vehicle 
has the relevant information, it had no way to use it. An example map of the task space where 
the vehicle was placed is given in Figure 5 Task and Environment. 
 
Figure 5 Task and Environment (Minato, Towards selective attention: generating image features by learning a visuo-motor 
map. , 2013) 
 
The robot is tasked with getting to a specified target whilst avoiding the obstacles in the 
diagram above. Here the vehicle now has to learn how to use the information it has in order 
to navigate the obstacles successfully. “In other words, the sensory data has not been 
interpreted for the robot” (Minato, Self-improvement for environmental change adaptation 
of mobile robot., 1998). This experiment has been done before by Nakamura (Nakamura, 
1996) but the experiment suffered with too many dimensions and a large state space hence 
Minato and Asada limited this experiment to the state in the above diagram. In this 
experiment it was decided to change only the number or configuration of obstacles and to 
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change them only slightly. The results show that even when the vehicle is informed of how 
the environment has changed around it still needed 145,000 trials to get one successful run 
of avoiding the obstacles. This was one successful trial amongst failures, not a sustained 
success after this number of trials. It would not be prudent to assume that a 1/145,000 
probability is a success and therefore I believe that the program is not intelligent.  Since the 
task definition is so small and the vehicle struggles with this, I do not think we can define this 
vehicle as intelligent. 
 
 
Objection to the Vehicles example 
 




In the Vehicle example, the vehicle, ultimately was only able to navigate to a limited extent in 
the one environment and was unable to perform this very successfully. On changing the 
problem space even slightly, it took hundreds of thousands of iterations for the robot to ‘learn’ 
how to navigate the space. Humans take time to learn new things but moving an object to one 
centimetre from the initial position would not give us large problems in navigating it if we had 
learned how to navigate objects in general. Humans navigate several objects and then apply 
the general concept to navigating other objects. Additionally, one would not just forget how 
to navigate an object after attempt 145,000 like the vehicle has and have to relearn how to 
navigate. There is an element of remembering or ‘muscle memory’ that ensures that humans 
continue to remember how to use skills that we learn through life.  We would also use any 
skills we had learned and adapt them to the environment we found ourselves in. Our skills are 
not restricted to one environment, such as only the room we learned to walk in. However, the 
vehicle is unable to navigate different problem spaces. It seems that the vehicle learned how 
to navigate one environment but was unable to apply this to a new environment and was 
therefore unable to adapt to the new environment.  As we mentioned, Nakamura tried the 
same experiment with more obstacle and the vehicle failed completely to navigate the 
environment as there were too many obstacles present. Whether this represents an 
immaturity in our programming or processing power we do not know but we can tell from this 
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example that, were we to release the robot into the world, it would not fare very well. Next, 











6.1.2 Robo Vacuum example 
 
In a conversation between the inventor of the Robo Vacuum and a Purchaser. The Purchaser 
said the vacuum was amazing at its job, right up until the point his Dog relieved itself on his 
carpet. Having left the Robo Vacuum on while he was at work, and unfortunately in the same 
room as the dog, the Purchaser was very annoyed.  
 
Objection – The Robo vacuum actually senses objects and works around them 
But this Robot is intelligent, it vacuums up, avoids obstacles and is able to know whether it 




“The Robo vacuum was unable to change its behaviour to avoid this new obstacle and, upon 
attempting to hoover it up, caused more issues than not”. (Molloy, 2016) This is because the 
programmer had not programmed in what the Vacuum need to do in this circumstance and 
the Robo Vacuum was  both unable to detect new types of obstacles and unable to learn what 
to do if it did detect one. The Robo Vacuum was unable to even detect types of obstacles in 
its way as it has no sonar or chip to process the image. So as good as it was in avoiding furniture 
and cleaning right up to the walls without bumping into them, the Robo Vacuum was only able 
to work in one way and the environment only came into play if it bumped into something. 
Otherwise the floor type, where the obstacles are and the types of obstacles that exist never 





6.1.2 The Rookie Bus Driver 
 
If we remember the Rookie Bus Driver example from earlier we can see that the Driver could 
have employed problem solving capabilities. The problem solving I speak of here is similar to 
the R1 R2 attempt to solve a problem and not the attempt to solve a system of equations.  
 
Computers stick to strict rules for specific tasks and have very little in the way of adaptive 
behaviour that would equate to true problem solving. Therefore, they can never achieve the 
spontaneous, thought out responses that humans can. A way of expanding the situation in the 
Rookie Bus Driver problem might be of the form, only stick to your route unless an emergency 
occurs – in which case drive to a hospital. However, what if the situation is slightly different 
i.e. there is a Nurse on the Bus or there is a terrorist attack down the street and a bomb goes 
off. Which rule does the driver obey, does he obey parts of each rule or invent a new solution? 
Does he follow the rule that says, don’t deviate from your route unless there is a medical 
emergency, when you should go to the hospital, unless there is a terrorist attack between you 
and the hospital etc etc ad infinitum.  
 
The way humans solve problems is quite complex. We do not stick to a set of rules we examine 
the situation around us and within seconds we form a plan of action based around what we 
think we should do in the circumstances. Even if we attached the CYC to a computer we would 
still not be able to program some code to take in every aspect of the situation we are in, 
choose the relevant points and then choose a plan of action as that would involve both 
processing so much information we would run out of processing power. We just haven’t 
figured out enough about how humans approach problems like this and therefore we can’t 





6.2  Adaptability –  Summary  
 
It is extremely difficult to programme into the Robo Vacuum all the eventualities that may 
come its way. Even in a home it could encounter, tea, bleach, dog mess, rope, children’s toys, 
etc. It would need to have a sensor that was able to detect and classify the above and then a 
chip that processed the information and commanded the Vacuum to take evasive action. This 
then makes this problem similar to Nakamura’s vehicle, and that is a problem we still can’t 
solve. 
 
These examples of the Robo Vacuum and Minato and Asado’s vehicles show that computers 
are not able to adapt to their environment or sometimes even detect their environment.  It 
also shows that humans don’t always know or understand all the rules they need to put into 
a program. This is an issue at a conceptual level for many program designers where they 
design the programs technically but not philosophically. The rules like “avoid the dog mess” 
are so simple we take them for granted and may not even think to program this into a 
computer as it is so intuitive. The problem with this is that the program is then missing quite 
essential parts of code which would enable it to adapt to even the simplest situations that we 
could forsee.  
 
To be charitable to my opponent I have thought of a reason that we may make errors in 
assuming that all machines are out to destroy us in one way or another. This reason is 










Throughout this paper we have seen humans ascribing qualities to computer programs and 
robots which would only be relevant to humans. This is what may have happened in the Turing 
Test. The most common objection to the Turing Test is that even if the programs responses 
were indistinguishable from ours, this would not prove that the program had intelligence, and 
this is because, if we look at only observable behaviour, then even a zombie could pass this 
test. Most AI is created to provide tools for humans rather than to create an intelligent being. 
Nevertheless, the question still persists in popular culture, can we make an intelligent program 
and what would it look like (Vincent, 2015) (Nolan, 2011).  
 
An error that causes mistakes like the one in the Turing Test, that I will come to later in the 
paper, is anthropomorphism. As Boden states “Colby’s ‘PARRY’ model fooled psychiatrists into 
thinking they were reading interviews with paranoiacs – because they naturally assumed they 
were”. This assumption that we are dealing with another human or ascribing human qualities 
to non-humans means that we do not objectively look at a computer program for what it is, 
rather we conflate its behaviour with human qualities. 
 
In the next section we see Braitenberg discuss this phenomenon on ascribing qualities that 
humans possess to animals or machines and then mistakenly concluding that, if these animals 





7.1.1 Braitenberg’s Vehicles and the risk of Anthropomorphism 
 
A famous example of people insisting on anthropomorphising machines comes from the book, 
Vehicles by Braitenberg (Braitenberg, 1986). Here Braitenberg describes the movements of a 
vehicle in response to stimuli. The vehicle and its behaviour would not normally be considered 
as intelligent as the exhibited behaviour is merely a response mechanism. However, 
Braitenberg illustrates the type of response humans can have to the machines, leading to 
them classifying the vehicles behaviour as ‘intelligent’.  Braitenberg states `We will talk about 
machines with very simple internal structure ... when we look at these machines or vehicles 
as if they were animals in a natural environment ... we will be tempted, then, to use 
psychological language in describing their behaviour. And yet we know very well that there is 
nothing in these vehicles that we have not put in ourselves.' (Braitenberg, 1986). This type of 
attribution of human qualities to machines I believe is what causes a lot of the scare stories 
around artificial intelligence. Whilst it is good to keep an eye on the future, I believe we must 
also understand what situation we are in, currently, in the present. It doesn’t follow that we 
always make this mistake in relation to computers but more often than not, in the literature 
on this topic we see human attributes associated with machines. 
Braitenberg’s experiments consisted of a number of vehicles made to behave in certain ways, 





7.1.2 The Vehicles 
 
Vehicle 1: Bravery 
 
Vehicle 1: the simplest vehicle. The speed of the motor (rectangular box at the tail end) is 
controlled by a sensor (half circle on a stalk, at the front end). Motion is always forward, in 






Figure 6 Vehicle 1 (Braitenberg, 1986) 
 
Braitenberg asks us what we would think if we saw this vehicle in a pond. He posits that we 
might think it is alive because it is swimming around in the pond and we have never seen a 
dead thing move like that. This is a very simplified comment, however, were we to see the 
vehicle running towards another object, say a fluffy toy, consistently, and hitting it we might 
think “wow that vehicle is a bit aggressive”. Alternatively, we might think it is love or friendship 
as the vehicle follows the fluffy toy wherever it goes. What is unlikely, however, is that we 
would frame the behaviour in terms of a science experiment. 
 
Vehicle 2: Fear and aggression 
 
 




Examining Vehicle 2a (Fear) If the stimulation is directly ahead, the vehicle may hit the source. 
Otherwise, it will tend to turn away from the stimulation.  This vehicle spends more time in 
the places with less stimulation and speeds up when exposed to more stimulation. 
(Braitenberg, 1986)  
Considering Vehicle 2b (Aggression) If the stimulation is directly ahead, the vehicle moves 
directly towards it as before. But, if the stimulation is to one side, the vehicle will tend to veer 
towards it with increasing speed (Braitenberg, 1986) 
If we watch these two vehicles for a while we can see that their characters are opposite. They 
both dislike sources of excitement. Vehicle 2a tends to avoid the source and run far enough 
away that it can’t feel the source anymore. Vehicle 2b however, runs towards the source in 
an attempt to destroy it. As above, we might think that the vehicles are ‘behaving’ in some 
particular way and exhibiting characteristics such as love or hate. However, we would be 
wrong to ascribe these qualities to these machines, or machines in general. 
Braitenberg produced many more complex examples of this type of behaviour in his text 
‘Vehicles’ (Braitenberg, 1986) but I feel this simple example is enough to illustrate, and 
















This paper supports the conclusion that machines are currently not, and may never be, 
intelligent in the same way as humans. I suggested that three criteria can show us whether a 
computer program is intelligent and that I would expect an intelligent entity to meet all three 
criteria in order to be genuinely intelligent. These three criteria are: 
 
A Not Rulebound 
B Ability to explore the full problem space 
C Ability to adapt 
 
I examined these three criteria in succession and all the examples of a program, such as a 
laptop, a Robo Vacuum or even seemingly sophisticated vehicles failed at least one, or more, 
criteria.   
I concluded Criterion A; not being rulebound, by stating that computer programs are 
necessarily rulebound and that in order for the program to operate outside the rules, we 
would have to program more rules to enable this to happen. Computers are essentially a tool 
for man, that man has designed and cannot make decisions for themselves outside their 
‘rulebook’.  
I then moved to Criterion B and discussed programs operating within a restricted problem 
space. I stated that computer programs such as Heuristics programs are unable to find a local 
minima but not a global minima because the programme is not able to access the full problem 
space and that this is a problem for all computer programs. We also examined The CYC as a 
source of human ‘common sense’ that a program would need to be able to access in order to 
understand the full problem space but the CYC is currently unusable for computer programs. 
  
Criterion C discussed the adaptability to one’s environment and after discussing the Minato 
and Asado experiment along with the Robo Vacuum example, I concluded that knowing what 
a relevant and irrelevant feature of your environment is, is learned from experience by a 
human. In a computer program this would involve programming in every single course of 
action, feature of the situations and relevance of each feature to the situation, which was 
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deemed not currently achievable.  Indeed, we do not know enough about our own intelligence 
yet to be able to code this type of information into a computer program.  
 
Finally, I conceded to my opponent that maybe anthropomorphism was the reason for the 
error we make in ascribing qualities we see in humans to a machine. I then illustrated this 
concept with Braitenberg’s study of vehicles which indicated that we tend to feel certain ways 
towards the vehicles that seemed to exhibit behaviour that humans would, such as fear, love 
or anger. 
 
It follows from these arguments that I believe that we cannot currently build anything that 
could threaten us, in the way many philosophers think (Boden, 2016) (Bostrom, 2016),  unless 
we code it to. 
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